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This paper studies price determination in pharmaceutical markets using data for 25 countries, 
six years and a comprehensive list of products from the MIDAS IMS database. We show that 
market power and the quality of the product has a significantly positive impact of prices. The 
nationality of the producer appears to have a small and often insignificant impact on prices, 
which suggests that countries which regulates prices have relatively little power to do it in a way 
that advances narrow national interest. We produce a theoretical explanation for this 
phenomenon based on the fact that low negotiated prices in a country would have a knock-on 
effect in other markets, and is thus strongly resisted by producers. Another key finding is that 
the U.S. has prices that are not significantly higher than those of countries with similar income 
levels. This, together with the former observation on the effect of the nationality of producers 
casts doubt on the ability of countries to pursue “free-riding" regulation. 
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1 Introduction
There are serious theoretical reasons for the existence of non-market interventions in the phar-
maceutical industry. The presence of substantial R&D and marketing (sunk) costs creates large
barriers to entry, which limits the positive effects of competition. In addition, the consumer is
typically insured, so she does not pay the full cost of the medicine. Furthermore, consumption
often requires a prescription, and the prescribing physician is, in most cases, insulated from
the economic aspects of the decision. This situation creates severe informational and incentive
problems, which make some kind of government regulation (or insurance company control) po-
tentially beneficial in theory. Indeed, Ballance et al. (1992) survey 56 nations and find that
most countries impose some form of price controls. But the amount of regulation varies a great
deal across countries, as they go from “substantial,” to “limited,” to “nonexistent.” Even the
form of regulation can be heterogeneous. As Scherer (2000) notes, the instruments can be: refer-
ence pricing, product per product negotiation, price caps, rate of return regulation and formula
pricing.
The existence of theoretical reasons for price intervention does not imply that actual regu-
lation is necessarily efficient. It may also exist to transfer rents from some groups of economic
agents to others. A firm, which spends vast amounts of money to develop a new drug, necessarily
has to expect large operating profits, after the discovery has been made. But at that time, it
may be in the (short-term) interest of a government to impose low prices for the product in
order to receive the goodwill of the consumers/voters. This problem becomes more acute if the
owners of the companies are mainly located in countries different from those where the products
are sold.1 The government when taking their decision will most likely consider the welfare of
their voters.2
Thus, the question of what determines actual regulation, rent-seeking or economic efficiency,
deserves an empirical investigation. In addition, of course, the prices of pharmaceuticals depend
on other economic factors, such as the usefulness of the products or the market power of the
producers, in different degrees. In spite of this interest, there has been no systematic empirical
study of the determinants of pricing in this industry for a large set of products and countries.3
In this paper we attempt to fill this vacuum. We study pricing in pharmaceuticals using a
multicountry and multiproduct data set from the IMS MIDAS international dataset for the
period 1998-2003. Our dataset encompasses a large number of countries including the top ten in
1Table 11b in Gambardella, Orsenigo and Pammolli (2000), for example shows the location of headquarters
(which have a strong correlation with main ownership nationality) of top 20 pharmaceutical corporation and their
markets.
2Notice that among the top 20 pharmaceutical firms only one is French, and none is Japanese or Italian.
Perhaps it will not come as a surprise, then, that those three countries are more heavily regulated; whereas
Germany, and, specially, the UK and the USA, with many more firms in the top 20 list, are less heavily regulated
or have relatively free pricing (see Danzon and Chao 2000a).
3The existing studies mostly look at small groups of chemicals for a few countries (Lu and Comanor 1998,
Danzon and Chao 2000a, 2000b Ekelund and Persson 2003).
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terms of pharmaceutical expenditures, as well as other countries that are either smaller in size or
with a lower income. The data comprises products from a large number of groups or anatomic
classifications. The richness of the data allow us to study the determinant of price variation
between countries, and we give special attention to both regulatory regimes and industrial
structure.
Literature The work of Danzon and Chao (2000a, 2000b) is specially relevant for our
purposes within the large literature on this topic. They study the effect of regulatory regimes on
price setting. Their data includes seven big countries in terms of spending which are classified in
terms of the severity of regulation.4 Danzon and Chao (2000a) estimate a reduced form equation
where prices depend on quality attributes of the product and on the competition characteristics
of the market. Their empirical results suggest that regulation limits the beneficial effect of
competition. Using similar data, Danzon and Chao (2000b) demonstrate that the conventional
view that drug prices are much higher in the US than in other countries is incorrect. The biased
perception is due to the small, unrepresentative samples and to the inappropriate methods used
in prior studies. In this paper we further confirm and amplify this view by showing, with a
much larger database and a robust empirical strategy, that the U.S. prices are indeed in line
with those of countries of similar income levels. In a similar vein, a study by the U.S. Department
of Commerce (2004) has argued that the lower (income-adjusted) prices induced by regulation
in the OECD countries, with respect to the U.S., hurts consumers in the long term through
the lower incentive for R&D and thus through lower discovery of life-saving drugs. Domı´nguez,
Ganuza and Llobet (2006) provide a theoretical counterargument. Price controls hurt small
(“me-too”) innovations more than the relatively price inelastic drastic innovations, and could
even induce larger investment by focusing firms on the drastic innovations. We have a more
fundamental challenge to the U.S. Department of Commerce (2004) results, since our more
carefully income-adjusted prices do not show that U.S. prices are indeed lower, in line with the
results of Danzon and Chao for a smaller database.
Kyle (2005) examines the effect of price controls in the extent and timing of the launch of new
4From more to less regulated, the first group includes Italy, France and Japan were launch prices are regulated
and afterward are revised downwards over the drug’s life cycle. The price of new varieties is related to the price of
established varieties. In addition, consumer and physicians demand are expected to be inelastic due to insurance
coverage, and generics substitution by pharmacists was not allowed in France and Italy at the time of the study.
Moreover, pharmacies are paid a margin on the product price which may encourage the sale of more expensive
products. The second group includes UK and Germany were corporations are free to set prices at launch but
prices cannot increase (freely) later on. In addition, in both countries there is some type of upper bound to prices,
implemented either through a reference price (Germany) or a maximum overall rate of return (UK). Generics
substitution by pharmacists is the main source of price-demand elasticity, since they keep the margin between
the reimbursement price and the manufacturers price. This is possible in UK, and to a lesser extent in Germany.
The third group includes US and Canada where prices are free, consumers’ and physicians’ demands appear to
be less inelastic and generic substitution on the side of the pharmacists is encouraged as a means to promote
competition.
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drugs around the world and finds that regulation has a statistically and quantitatively important
effect on pharmaceutical launches. The effect takes two forms. First, drugs invented by firms
headquartered in countries that use price controls reach fewer markets and with longer delays
than products that originate in countries without price controls. Second, companies delay launch
into price-controlled markets, and are less likely to introduce their products in additional markets
after entering a country with low prices. Launches into low price countries in Europe are further
delayed after a regulatory change allowing parallel imports, which could potentially depress
prices in high price markets. The findings of Kyle (2005) support our theoretical explanation
for our own finding that the effect of the nationality of the producers on prices is negligible. We
argue theoretically that the fear of reducing prices in markets with high prices leads producers
to a strategically credible resistance to price reduction in more regulated countries.
In terms of empirical specification, previous evidence in this industry suggest that marginal
costs are almost irrelevant in the industry and recommend the use of a hedonic price approach.
For example, Berndt et al (1999) estimate a hedonic price equation that measures the price
impact of drug attributes. Likewise, we do not attempt to estimate marginal cost effects on
prices.
The effect of entry of generic products on price evolution has attracted recently a lot of
attention. The empirical evidence on this issue is ambiguous. Some authors (Grabowski and
Vernon, 1992 and 1997, and Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz 1991) report that brand-name prices
increased after the entry of generic competition, while others (Wiggins and Maness, 1994) find
a reduction in brand-name prices following entry. Finally, Frank and Salkever (1992 and 1997)
report that brand name prices increased while generic products prices fell, producing a reduction
in average prices. Our analysis shows that generics prices are indeed lower than those of brand
name products, and we also show (see section 5.3), that the impact of the number of competitors
depends on the therapeutical class analyzed (thus explaining the diverging results of earlier
literature).
Empirical strategy and results Our empirical strategy introduces several innovations
with respect to the previous empirical literature in the subject.
1. We estimate pricing equations separately for each country, and then we obtain estimates
by pooling the countries. By pooling the sample we will be able to explore the interplay
of cross-national variables and regulation in price setting. For example, by including as
an explanatory variable the GDP per capita, or the ratio of public spending to GDP, we
can assess, in a very disaggregate context, whether higher prices are observed primarily in
richer countries or in countries with larger public sectors.5
5Danzon and Furukawa (2003) suggest theoretically that fixed costs should be distributed across countries
depending on demand elasticities, so that higher prices should be observed in richer countries. This suggests that
in a multi-country study, like ours, variables with cross-country variation should be included in the regression.
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2. We exploit the panel nature of the data and control for unobserved heterogeneity at the
product level. By doing so, we control for time invariant factors that affect price setting.
In particular we control for “unobserved´´ marginal effects. However, this comes at a cost,
since this reduces notably the variation of the data. In this context, we identify the effect
of time-invariant variables by following a two-stage procedure.
3. With the exception of products without consumption or information in a given period, we
do not restrict the sample in any way. However, we do explore the sensitivity of our results
to the restriction of the sample in several dimensions:
(a) The restriction to single molecule products, which has been explored in other studies.6
(b) The variation of the sample to the number of countries where a corporation is present.
(c) The variation of the sample to the number of countries a molecule is present.
(d) The analysis by therapeutical category.
By exploring these dimensions we are able to assess the robustness of the results to the
restriction of the sample, as well as the effects of increasing the “internationality” of the
corporations analyzed and the “diffusion” of molecules.
Our results show that variables related to the quality of the product are strongly significant
in explaining the prices. For example, older products are less expensive, and recently approved
ones command a price premium. This is reassuring, as it represent a check that pricing has an
element of rationality, but possibly it is not very surprising. There is also robust evidence in the
data that market forces operate in the expected way. This can be seen in the fact in that larger
firms (measured in different ways) tend to command higher prices, although not strongly in
quantitative terms. Also, generic products, which operate in off-patent markets (thus, probably
more competitive ones) have lower prices.
Another sensible finding is that higher per-capita income produces higher prices in any given
country, most likely derived from a lower price elasticity, confirming Danzon and Furukawa
(2003) theoretical observation.7 There is also a positive effect on prices of a higher ratio of public
expenditure to GDP. The interpretation of this finding is less straightforward. Most likely, a
higher public expenditure to GDP also signals a low price elasticity, relative to countries with
the same income, probably derived from higher insulation of consumers from prices through
national health insurance. However, the size of this effect depends on the level of regulation,
and it is larger for less regulated countries.
6For example, Danzon and Chao (2000a).
7“the global joint costs should be recouped through price markups over marginal cost that differ based on
income levels, assuming that income is a major determinant of “true” price elasticity. Thus, price differentials
that are related to income would be consistent with both economic efficiency and equity.” Danzon and Furukawa
(2003, p. 534).
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To understand the impact of regulation we classified the countries in our sample in three
groups, from less to more regulated.8 We observe that the country fixed effect of more regulated
countries tends, indeed, to be lower than that of the rest, although this is far from universal,
and substantial variation remains. It is, thus, interesting to note that prices do not necessarily
conform with the conventional wisdom about countries regulatory habits and regimes. As it
turns out, the fixed effect of the U.S.A. is significantly higher than that, of Canada (but not for
all specifications), France or Italy. This means that if average prices in the U.S.A. are higher it
is not because other countries engage in
“free riding regulation,” but because its per-capita income is higher. And in fact, in many
cases, the U.S.A. pays less, not more, than countries of similar income or lower income (such as
Eastern European countries).9 Our interpretation is that its larger, more competitive, market
provides with some protection with respect to similarly rich countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first present in section 2 a model which
accounts for the empirical findings we discuss in later sections. Then, in section 3, we present the
empirical strategy. Section 4 explains the data and the construction of the variables employed.
Section 5 presents the main results from the analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We assume demand for a pharmaceutical product to be iso-elastic, so as to estimate a log-linear
specification. In other words, we can write it:
Q = exp[A(P c, v, S)]p−βQ
implying
lnQ = A(P c, v, S)− β ln pQ.
The function A(P c, v, s) subsumes all the factors affecting demand which do not come from
the own price of the good. The main ones, as the notation makes clear, and which we use in
the estimation, come from direct or indirect substitutes (P c), the quality of the product (v,
innovativeness, perceived quality) or size of the market (S).
We have stressed in the introduction one aspect of the pricing problem which we think is of
paramount importance. Namely, we are interested in how the price varies across countries. There
are strategic complications that arise from the fact that in this market, the usual competitive
assumptions tend to be wrong. Some government regulate heavily the prices of pharmaceutical,
and others do not. Even the countries who do not regulate markets are affected by others’
regulations, as current media controversies in the U.S. regarding prices abroad reflect. This
implies that the national differences in price behavior could be large, as we will see in the
8See section 4 for an explanation of the classification method.
9This implies that we partially confirm (and extend to a much larger and varied set of countries) the findings
in Danzon and Chao (200b)
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estimation, and may come from unexpected sources. In order to clarify some of the issues at
stake, let us present a simplified political economy model that captures some interesting facets
of the problem.
Assume that a pharmaceutical company sells monopolistically in two countries a product
which it produces at constant marginal cost c (the monopoly may occur because it holds a valid
patent). Demands at the Home (H) and Foreign (F ) countries are log-linear (as in the model
we estimate):
lnQH = AH − b ln pH ; lnQF = AF − b ln pF
The prices are determined through a game, which is intended to capture an important fact of
real-life markets. Namely, many of the producing countries are large, rich, or both (the U.S., the
U.K., Switzerland). Many of the countries doing strict price regulation have negligible industries.
If governments regulate with an eye on the welfare of their own country, they would perhaps
tend to be harsh on the foreign companies. As we will see in the data, though, that is not the
case. Our model will produce both the tendency for harsh regulation as well as an endogenous
protective circumstance. This protection comes from the fact that, either by arbitrage, or by
policy (governmental or from large purchasers, such as HMOs), the prices abroad affect the
prices at home. So firms from unregulated countries which accept low prices abroad, can suffer
at home (which, remember, may be a large market). And they could refuse to sell at all, if the
foreign government demands too low a price. Knowing which, of course, the foreign government
will set the minimum price consistent with participation of the foreign company.
More formally, let the government of the H country pursue a price-control policy. It unilat-
erally sets the maximum price at which the company can sell the product in country H, pH . The
firm can choose between selling in that country, in which case it must choose a price pH ≤ pH
or not to sell the good at all. In the F country the regulation is of the reference price type,
that is, pF ≤ pH . With isoelastic prices, the monopolistic price is equal in both countries. This
means that the reference price constraint is always binding, and pF = pH provided the good is
sold in both countries and that the price set in F is lower than its monopoly price.10
If the company has headquarters in the H country, the regulator sets the price to maximize
consumer surplus at H, plus firms profits. Since the prices set in this way are never higher
than those preferred by the monopolist, the price constraint of the government will always be
binding. Thus, the price in country H is completely determined by the regulator, by solving the
following program:
max
p
AH
p1−β
β − 1 +
(
AHp
−β +AF p−β
)
(p− c)
subject to
(
AHp
−β +AF p−β
)
(p− c) ≥ pi∗F
10An alternative modeling choice, with similar implications, would be to think that pharmaceutical imports are
legal, and then arbitrage would force a single price in both countries.
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where pi∗F is the monopoly profit of selling only at F, in which case it is sold at monopoly prices,
and is given by
pi∗F = AF
(
βc
β − 1
)−β ( βc
β − 1 − c
)
. We solve the problem both with and without the constraint and then show when is the con-
straint binding at the optimum. The price p that solves the problem without the constraint
is
p∗ =
β (AF +AH) c
(β − 1) (AF +AH) +AH
The price p∗ satisfies the constraint if:
(AH +AF )
(
β (AF +AH) c
(β − 1) (AF +AH) +AH
)−β ( β (AF +AH) c
(β − 1) (AF +AH) +AH − c
)
≥
AF
(
βc
β − 1
)−β ( βc
β − 1 − c
)
(1)
Denote by λ = AF / (AH +AF ) , then we can rewrite equation (1):(
βc
(β − 1) + λ
)−β ( βc
(β − 1) + λ − c
)
≥ λ
(
βc
β − 1
)−β ( βc
β − 1 − c
)
(
1
(β − 1) + λ
)−β ( β
(β − 1) + λ − 1
)
≥ λ
(
1
β − 1
)−β ( β
β − 1 − 1
)
(
(β − 1) + λ
β − 1
)β−1
≥ λ
1− λ
Thus, when λ is significantly smaller from one, this can be achieved. This is reasonable when
H is a sufficiently larger/richer country.
On the other hand, if the company has headquarters at F, the regulator sets prices so that
consumer surplus is maximized, and thus, it sets the minimum price consistent with the firm
selling in H. Thus, the problem with the firm headquartered at F is:
max
p
AH
p1−β
β − 1
subject to
(
AHp
−β +AF p−β
)
(p− c) ≥ pi∗F
Notice that this program is such that the objective of the regulator is to set the minimal price
consistent with the constraint, call it pc
Put simply, we have a model that predicts that the price set by the regulator is weakly higher
for the local multinational than for the foreign one. But as λ grows it reaches a point when the
constraint becomes binding. This means that as the size of F grows with respect to H the price
of the foreign multinational converges to that of the local multinational. Thus, suppose that
countries which are more heavy regulators in practice are relatively small in size. This would
imply that they cannot influence substantially the prices in favor of the local multinationals. Or
at least, they cannot influence prices enough for this to show in a relevant relationship in the
data. As we will see, this is indeed the case in our data.
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3 Econometric specification
In the previous section we have shown that the equilibrium price for product i of firm f in
market k and country j, p
′
ikj , can be represented as a function of competitors’ pricing strategies,
quality variables and other factors, summarized in the function A∗ikj . Taking this into account,
we consider the following log-linear specification:
log(p
′
ifkjt) = α+A
∗
ifkjt + vifkjt
where t denotes time, and v denotes an error term, and α is a parameter. We further consider
that
log(A∗ifkjt) = X
′
ifkjtβ + Z
′
ijγ + ηr + ηj + dt
where X and Z are vectors of respectively time-variant and time-invariant variables that
potentially affect equilibrium prices, and β and γ are the corresponding vectors of parameters.
The term ηr represents a specific effect, where r is (depending on the specification) either
i, f, or, k; ηj is a country specific effect, and dt is a time specific factor. After replacing these
expressions in the above equation we obtain:
log(p
′
ifkjt) = α+X
′
ifkjtβ + Z
′
iγ + ηr ++ηj + dt + vifkjt (2)
Note that when r = i, both the effect of Zij and ηj are absorbed by the individual effects
and, consequently, it are not directly identifiable. 11 Since we have a genuine interest in some
time-invariant factors, we follow a two-stage procedure to estimate them (Mundlak, 1978): we
first estimate the above equation and obtain an estimate of ηi, say ηˆi, and then, in a second
stage, we regress ηˆi against the time invariant factors. That is we estimate the equation:
ηˆi = Z ′iγ + ηf + ηk + ηj + ui (3)
where ui is an error term and ηk, ηf , and ηj control for market (or molecule), firm and
country specific effects, respectively. Depending on the exact assumption about them, we follow
one estimation strategy or another. For example, in case we assume they are random and
uncorrelated with the variables in Z, then an LS estimate of the above equation identifies the
parameters of the model. Alternatively, we can follow a conditional approach and use an LSDV
estimator controlling either ηk, ηf or ηj or all three terms altogether. We’ll explore some of
these possibilities in data.
An alternative strategy to identify the effect of the Z variables is to assume that the prod-
uct specific effects (ηi) are well represented by the combination of market effects, say ηk (or,
alternatively corporation effects, say ηf ) and the Z ′ijγ component. Note that, in this particular
case, the effect of the variables in Z can be identified in just one step.
11Note that ηj is also not identifiable when the sample is restricted to a single country.
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We carry the analysis at two levels: country by country (25 countries) and pooling the
data for all the countries. Note that in the latter case the country specific effects are fully
identifiable. Since the number of markets and number of product varies across countries, we
check the robustness of the results to the variation in two complementary dimensions: the
number of countries in which the corporation to which the product belongs is present (for
example: 1+, 10+, 20+, 25), and the number of countries in which a given molecule is present
(for example: 1+, 10+, 20+, 25). We also present results when restricting the sample to single
molecules, and when restricting it to products for which the molecule and the corporation is
present in all the countries of the sample.
Regarding the estimation methods, we estimate equations (2 and 3) using a Within Groups
panel data method. In the first stage, we control for time-invariant heterogeneity across product,
while in the second we control for this heterogeneity across molecules. In order to avoid potential
endogeneity problems of some variables, we follow an IV approach and lag all the time-varying
(potentially endogenous) covariates in the model.
4 Data, construction of the variables and specification
We use a multi-country and multi-product data set from the IMS MIDAS international database
for the period 1998-200312. This dataset encompasses a large number of countries including the
top ten in terms of expenditure, as well as medium size and small countries (see Table 1 for a
list of countries and summary statistics). It also includes a large number of groups or anatomic
classifications, and allows to study the price variation across countries which differ in terms of
both regulatory regimes and industrial structure. Many corporations supply drugs in several of
these markets that can be defined at different levels of disaggregation. In the current study we
regard the 4-digits Anatomic therapeutical classification (ATC4) as a market, but it would be
desirable to contrast our results using alternative levels of disaggregation.13 Table 2 presents the
distribution of corporations depending on the number of markets supplied and Table 3 presents
the distribution of molecule ages by countries.
4.1 Variables and first stage and second stage specifications
The dependent variable in our analysis , called Price, corresponds to sales revenue divided by the
number of ‘standard units’ sold. Accordingly, when several formulations of the product co-exist
in the market, this corresponds to a weighted average of the price per standard unit of all these
alternative formulations. Nominal country specific quantities are converted to 2000 US $.
12Our data includes information from the 4th quarter of each year, except for 2003, for which the information
is provided for the 2nd quarter.
13The ATC code was not provided in the original data supplied from IMS. Fortunately we obtained an additional
sample from IMS Spain which helped us to recover the ATC for the rest of the countries. We managed to match
practically all the records in sample.
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Marginal costs are almost irrelevant in this industry.14 Accordingly, in our regression we
use a hedonic approach and include quality and competition variables (see section A.1 of the
appendix for a list of variables with definitions) to proxy the equilibrium price. Our controls
can be classified in one of two categories: time-variant and time-invariant controls.
Our list of time variant controls or first stage controls includes: the firm’s size, Fsize, which
is constructed as total corporation sales (excluding sales of the product under analysis) in each
country. Firm’s size is included in log form in order to give more weight two differences in
small values than in large values and it is lagged one period in order to avoid endogeneity
problems. The average global price of the molecule (excluding the product under consideration)
or Globalprice. The variable Ngen is the number of generic products in each market and country.
New is a dummy variable equal to one if the product was launched in the previous year and
zero otherwise.
Among the competition variables we include the Hirschmand-Herfinda¨hl concentration index
of the local firms (excluding the firm the product belongs to), HHI. We also include the market
share of the corporationMshare, in the market and its square, since we would expect that higher
sales lead to higher prices. In order to capture differential effects between local and foreign firms
we interact these variables with the local and local multinational dummies (to be defined later).
Again both variables could be regarded as endogenous and we lag them one period.
Finally, we construct several share variables: the market share of each variety in the market,
Mshare, the market share of all the national products in the market, Natshare, and the Berry
index which measures the degree of specialization of the corporation.
Our list of time invariant controls starts with the Fquota, defined as the average firm quota
in the country. Singlemol takes a value of one, if the product consists of a single molecule, and
zero otherwise. Molecule age, Molage, is the time elapsed since the molecule was launched to
December 31, 2003. The age distribution of molecules and products is presented in Table 3. We
also include to Censormol, which equals 1 if the product was launched before January 1, 1991 and
zero otherwise; Censorlag, which equals one for products launched before January 1, 1991 and
one otherwise. We also include Summol which counts the number of countries a given molecule
is present. Therefore it can be interpreted as a proxy of diffusion of a molecule. We finally
construct dummies controlling the type of firm: local, local-multinational and multinational,
for respectively local-non multinational, local-multinational and non-local multinational firms.
They are interacted with Fquota, Mshare as well as New.
Following Danzon and Furukawa (2003) suggestions, in the time variant pooled countries
specification we control for differences between the countries with two variables: FPC or fraction
of public consumption in GDP, and GDPPCUSD or GDP per capita in 2000 US $. Both of them
are interacted with a set of regulatory dummies. We consider three levels of regulation (low,
14See, e.g. Berndt, Cockburn and Griliches, 1996, Suslow, 1996, Berndt, Pindyck and Azoulay, 1999, and
Cockburn and Anis, 2001.
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medium and high, respectively):15 (I) Australia, Czech Republic, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Hungary, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the US;
(II) Austria, Belgium, France, Japan, Greece, Portugal, Spain; (III) Argentina, Brazil, Egypt,
Italy, Portugal.16
For the regression analysis we use log transformations of Price, Fsize, Globalprice Molage,
and Summol so we value more the differences in smaller than in larger values. In order to avoid
potential simultaneity bias all the regressors are lagged one period except for those related to
the age of the product, which by nature are predetermined (specially once we control for New).
5 Results and interpretation
In this section we present the results from the empirical analysis. We begin with a review of the
country-by-country results and continue with the pooled results (for all products as well divided
by anatomic therapeutical group).
5.1 Country by country results
In tables 4 to 6 we present the country-by-country results of the first (top panel in each table)
and second stage (bottom panel) regressions for all the countries in sample. In all the first
stage regressions we use a IV-FE estimator, and a standard LS estimator in all the second stage
regressions. Likewise, in all cases we present results with the complete sample of products.
[Detailed results with restricted subsamples –by either restricting the number of countries a
given corporation (C dimension), or a given molecule (M dimension), is present– are available
upon request.]
After controlling for product (and time) fixed effects, the explanatory power of time varying
variables is very limited in practically all the countries, evidencing very little time-series variation
in the data. Despite so, we still are able to identify some regularities across countries.
• Key findings in first stage country-specific regressions:
1. Both the market share of national products in the market the product belongs to,
the concentration of local products, and the Berry index seem to have little effect on
prices.
15See Table 1 for summary statistics for all the countries. The classification was done by sending the list
of countries to three experts in health and pharmaceutical economics, prior to the statistical analysis of our
data. We asked them for a classification of countries in the list in three groups. In the very few cases where the
classification was not anonymous (no country was ever placed in three different categories), we ranked it according
to the majority view. The experts, whose help is gratefully acknowledged were:.Guillem Lo´pez, Fe´lix Lobo and
Vicente Ortu´n.
16Note that our classification, for the top countries, in terms of expending, is similar to that employed in Danzon
and Chao (2000a, 2000b).
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2. New products get a small premium in a number of countries. The largest premium is
observed for the US (whose results are reported in the last column of table 6). The
nationality of the product does not command a significant change on the premium for
novel products with two notable exceptions: the case of Italy in which new products
from exclusively local producers get an extra premium and Canada where new product
from local multinationals also get an important premium.
3. Other things equal, the effect of firm size in prices is either non-significant or negative
but small. The largest effects are found in Denmark and the US.
4. The number of generics in the molecule, significantly reduces the level of prices in a
large number of countries. In this case the larger effect are found in Italy and Japan.
For the US the effect of the number of generics is insignificant.
5. Global prices have very little independent effect, with the notable exceptions of Ger-
many, Spain and the US.
• Key findings in second stage country-specific regressions:
1. Other things equal, products from exclusively local corporations have lower prices in
practically all the countries. The effect of being local multinational is less clear, since
in a number of countries the effect is either insignificant or negative. Non-significant
coefficients imply that local and foreign multinational are treated equally. This is
the case of the US or Canada, among other countries. In fact, with the exception
of France, in all countries with a significant pharmaceutical industry, both local and
foreign multinational are treated equally. Apart of this, in a number of countries
we find a significantly negative coefficient (France, Italy, and Sweden among other
countries). However, in practically all cases the implicit coefficient lays in between of
those for exclusively local corporations and foreign multinational firms. Thus large
multinational conglomerates seem to receive a premium over small, local, producers.
2. With the exception of Poland, the effect of single molecule is either non-significant or
positive, specially in big pharmaceutical markets (notably Canada, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK and the US).
3. In a large majority of countries the coefficient of the generic variable is significantly
negative, with the notable exception of Canada. The largest negative effects are
observed in Belgium, France, Norway, Hungary and the UK.
4. Finally, our proxy for diffusion of a molecule, summol, affects positively product
prices in a large number of countries (Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Rep.,
Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
UK and the US.
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Let us now turn to pooled results, which are expected to be very informative since the
variation in data augments drastically.
5.2 Pooled Results
In tables 7 and 8 we respectively present the result of the first and second stage regressions when
pooling the information of all countries in sample. In both tables columns (1) and (2) present
respectively the all-products and single molecule first stage and second stage results. The rest
of the columns in the aforementioned tables present the results when varying the number of
countries a corporation is present (dimension C) and the number of countries the molecule is
present (dimension M).17 The exploration of the results in these two dimensions will help us
to, firstly, check the sensitivity of the results to the sample employed, and, secondly, to better
understand the underlining common characteristics of the problem. As in the previous section, in
all the first stage regression, we use a IV-FE estimator (with product fixed effects) with clustered
standard errors. Alternatively, in all the second stage regression we use a LS-FE estimator (with
molecule fixed effect).
We obtain a number of interesting results in the first stage regressions.
1. Neither the share of local product or the degree of concentration affect strongly (in a
quantitative sense) the prices. In fact the effect of the share of local product is even
negative when we restrict the sample to products of corporation presents in many countries.
Regardless of the dimension explored, the effect of the firm size is significantly negative,
but small. The degree of specialization of the corporation seems to have a positive effect
on prices as we move along the C dimension, but this is not confirmed when we move in
the M dimension. Apart from this, the number of generics does not seem to have any
systematic effect on prices.
2. As expected, new products get a premium which increases in the two dimensions explored.
Interestingly, we find that new product launches on the part of local innovative firms
receive a larger premium than other types of (multinational) firms. As we shall illustrate
in the next section (see table 9) the finding is robust to the analysis by therapeutical class.
3. The effect of the global price is always positive and significant. The effect decreases when
the number of countries the corporation is present increases and increases with the diffusion
of the molecule. It is also interesting to note that the absence of a global price (or global
reference, which means the product is innovative) increases significantly the price (above
1/3 if we move in the C dimension, and above 1/2 if we move in the molecule dimension).
17We present results when the sample is restricted to products which belong to corporation or molecules present
in 1+ (all sample), 10+ or 25 countries. Results for other restricted samples are in line with the ones presented
here and are available upon request.
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4. Finally, the pooling strategy allows us to identify the effect of some aggregate variables,
such us the fraction of public expenditure in the GDP and the per capita GDP. After pre-
liminary exploration of the date we interacted both variables with the level of regulation
(from 1, low, to 3, high). For low regulated countries (REG1), the effect of both variables
is positive and significant and increases in the two dimensions studied. In particular, other
things equal, an increase of one percentage basis points in the fraction of public expendi-
tures in the GDP translates into a 1.2 and 2.0 percent increase in the price, depending on
the specification. Note that the elasticity increases as we move in the C dimension and
reduces with the M dimension. Likewise, the price elasticity of the GDP per capita is very
high, between 2.0 and 0.8 depending on the specification. In contrast with the result for
the fraction of public expenditure, the price elasticity of the GDP per capita reduces as
we move in either the C or the M dimension. In medium and high regulated countries the
effect of the fraction of public consumption in the GDP gets reduced significantly, except
for those molecule that are present in all the countries. Alternatively, the effect of the
GPD is significantly higher for both types of countries.
We now turn our attention to second stage regressions results.
1. Being a product from a exclusively-local corporation clearly reduces the price by approxi-
mately 15 per cent regardless of the dimension studied.
2. Alternatively, being a product from a local multinational has no clear effect on prices except
for those product in which the corporation and the molecule is present in all countries (last
column of Table 8). In this particular case the effect is sizeable and negative. Thus, in
general local and international multinational corporations are treated equally.
3. We find that on average the price for generic products is between -0.15 and -0.20 percent
lower than other prices. Again, the effect is larger when the sample is restricted to products
of corporation and molecules present in all countries.
The analysis of country fixed effects, as reported in Table 8 and Figure 1 for selected cases,
gives us a very interesting picture of the role of the regulation. First of all, price in developing
countries (with the exception, in some cases, of Egypt) or very regulated (European) countries
are lower than in less regulated countries, particularly lower than in the US. As we move to a
more homogeneous sample in the C dimension the price gap is more evident. Alternatively, when
we move in the M dimension (varying the number of countries a given molecule is present), the
effect is less evident, even non-significant in some cases. The differences are more evident when
we look to the last column of Table 8 (were the sample is restricted to products of corporations
and molecules present in all countries, see also Figure 1): the average country effect for the
very regulated countries is -4.80, for the regulated ones -3.20 and for the low regulated countries
-0.435.
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Within the group of less regulated countries (which includes the Northern, Eastern and some
Central European countries plus Australia, Canada and the US) we can also document several
interesting findings. Firstly, in the overall sample (or the sample of single molecules) there is
little evidence than average prices are higher in the US than in other countries (particularly the
Eastern European ones, but also other countries), since we find a number of cases for which
the country fixed effect is positive. Note that this finding is in accordance with the results
in Danzon and Chao (2000b) but obtained in a much more general sample both in terms of
products and countries considered. Secondly, as we move in the C dimension, all the country
specific effects decrease, that is, those positive are closer to zero or change sign to negative
(this is the case of Canada, Germany, Switzerland and UK) and those negative turn out more
negative. Thirdly, when we move in the M dimension the initial picture remains basically
unaltered. Thus, the US have a relatively lower price (compared to other developed countries)
for products manufactured by multinationals, and a higher price with products that are “very
common” (probably at a later stage in their life cycle). This is consistent with the explanation
that the U.S., with her insistence in competition rather than regulation to contain prices, does
well for goods where there can be competition (mostly off-patent not quite innovative goods).
On the other hand, the other (mostly European) developed countries are successful at capping
the prices of patented innovative goods, whereas they are less able to contain prices for products
where competition could do a good job at restraining prices in the absence of regulation.
Apart of this it is interesting to note the case of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden, which are classified in the group of ”low” regulated countries), whose asso-
ciated coefficients all over Table 8 are significantly more negative than the rest of the coefficients
for the group of low regulated countries. This implies that Nordic countries manage to achieve
lower prices without a stronger regulation, suggesting an interesting avenue for future research.
5.3 Pooled results by therapeutical class
In tables 9 and 10 we present the pooled sample results of the first and second stage regressions
by therapeutical class.18 We only present results when the sample is not restricted in any
dimension. As a rule, the analysis by therapeutical class gives a very similar qualitative picture
than the pooled analysis we have performed in the previous section.
In the first stage regressions we obtain the following results.
1. The effect of the share of national product is in general non-significant with some important
exceptions: class C, for which it is negative, and classes L and M for which it is positive.
2. We confirm that once we control for product effects, the effect of the degree of concentration
of national producers, the Berry index or firm size are not, as a rule, significant.
18We have analyzed twelve classes: see variable definition for a list of classes.
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Figure 1: Country effects for selected models.
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3. We also find that new products from exclusively local producers get a small premium for
practically all therapeutical classes.
4. As found in previous studies the effect of the number of generics in the market is ambiguous
since it is positive for classes A, N and R and negative for classes J and M.
5. The results of the country level variables (GDP per capita and Public expenditure to GDP
ratio) are mostly in line with those reported in Table 7. The elasticity of the price to the
size of the public sector ranges from 1.4 (class C) to 3.0 (class H) and the elasticity of the
GDP per capita ranges from 0.62 (class H, non-significant) to 2.5 (class A). The effect of
the size of the public sector reduces significantly as we move to more regulation. On the
contrary, the effect of the GDP per capita either does not vary with the level of regulation
or it increases mildly.
The second stage results by therapeutical class clearly confirm that products from exclusively
local firms are, other things equal, cheaper than products from multinational corporations.
In contrast, we do not detect differences in any therapeutical class between local and foreign
multinationals. The results for the rest of the quality variables are, as a rule, in accordance with
expectations.
Results for country fixed effect are also in line with those we discussed in the previous
section. The estimated coefficients for very regulated countries are negative, which implies
that regulation, other things equal, reduces average prices for practically all the anatomical
therapeutical groups. What is more interesting is the fact that, for a large number of groups, the
US is not, other things equal, the country with highest prices. In fact, average prices in Eastern
(low regulated) European countries are, in a majority of groups, higher. More importantly, in
some groups average prices in the UK, the nordic countries, Switzerland or, even Canada, are
higher.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated empirically the determinants of prices for pharmaceuticals.
We have used a more extensive database than most previous studies, and we have used a large
number of controls and paid a close attention to the empirical strategy and specification.
The sensibility of our results in other domains has allowed us to tackle the thorny question of
the determinants of regulation. We argued that an obvious footprint of rent-seeking regulation
would be the existence of lower prices in countries without significant industrial presence. Our
answer is robust, but contrary to conventional wisdom. In most countries, their own multina-
tionals command no price premium with respect to foreign ones. Local, non-multinational firms
tend to have lower prices than any multinational, and whether these multinationals are foreign
or local does not affect prices in a statistically significant way.
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Our results, thus, do not support the view that the outcome of regulation conforms with
the short-sighted best interest of local consumers. We do have evidence, on the other hand,
that quality matters for prices, that firms exercise considerable market power, and that all
multinational corporations obtain a price advantage. We have constructed a theoretical model
that accounts for all this findings simultaneously. The model is one of an imperfectly competitive
market. Demand is sensitive to quality, and firms, which can be purely local, or multinational,
have their prices regulated by a government who cares only about the benefits of its voters. The
explanation for the absence of a local price premium is that multinationality confers a protection
against government intervention. Firms know that allowing prices to go too low in one country
could lower prices in all others, say because of the existence of reference prices. They may
prefer, thus, to exit completely one market rather than allowing it to spoil profits in all others.
Knowing this, and since the product has indeed a value for voters, the regulator will refrain
from driving too hard a bargain. Thus, there is a sense in which a reference price (or similar)
policy in one country becomes a “commitment device” to avoid lowering price in another one.
Its effects are akin to the low-price guarantees that have been widely studied in the industrial
organization literature (Holt and Scheffman 1987, Arbatskaya, Hviid, Shaffer 2004) because of
their anticompetitive implications.
Also, our results do not support the view that the U.S. has higher prices than the rest of the
countries in the sample. This confirms and extends prior work of Danzon and Chao (2000b),
and contradicts the assertions contained in the U.S. Department of Commerce report (2004).
An interesting avenue for further research is to explain how some countries with low regulation
(such as the Nordic countries) achieve significantly lower average prices than others.
In this paper we have thus argued that pharmaceutical prices do not show signs of being
driven by pure rent-shifting motives from politicians. This does not mean that they are set in
a way that maximizes welfare. Indeed, these prices have to balance the provision of long term
incentives to innovation with the needs of present generations, something that is particularly
difficult given the decentralized way in which regulations occur throughout the world. A neces-
sary extension to the current work would be to ascertain empirically the relationship between
current prices and socially efficient ones. This would, of course, require further theoretical work
to determine a good benchmark (or a set of them) for socially efficient prices.
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A Variable definition and descriptive statistics
A.1 Variable definition
Variable definition
Price Sales revenue divided by the number of standard units sold (in logs)
Natshare The market share of all national products in the ATC4 market
HHI-local The Hirschmand-Herfinda¨hl concentration index for national firms in the ATC4 market
fsize Firm size (in logs)
new A dummy taking one if the product was first observed in the previous year
Berry index The Berry index measure the degree of specialization of the corporation
Ngen Number of identified generics in the market
dum-GP n.a. Dummy of absence of a global price of reference
global price Average global price of the molecule in US real $
local A dummy taking one if the corporation is local-non multinational
localmulti A dummy taking one if the corporation is local but multinational
singlemol A dummy taking one if the product is not composite
lsummol Log of the number of market a molecule is present
generic A dummy taking one if the product is generic
Mshare Market share of each variety in the ATC4 market
Fquota Average (in sample) firm quota of the firm in a given country
molage Time elapsed since the molecule was launched to December 31, 2003.
censormol A dummy taking one if the molecule was launched before January 1, 1991
censorlag A dummy taking one if the product was launched before January 1, 1991
fpc Fraction of public consumption in GDP (source: UN; in logs)
gdppcusd GDP per capita in 2000 US $ (source: UN, in logs)
REG Level of regulation: 1 low, 2 medium, 3 high.
THERAPEUTICAL CLASSES
A ALIMENTARY TRACT AND METABOLISM
B BLOOD AND BLOOD FORMING ORGANS
C CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM
D DERMATOLOGICALS
G GENITO URINARY SYSTEM AND SEX HORMONES
H SYSTEMIC HORMONAL PREPARATIONS, EXCL. SEX HORMONES AND INSUL
J ANTIINFECTIVES FOR SYSTEMIC USE
L ANTINEOPLASTIC AND IMMUNOMODULATING AGENTS
M MUSCULO-SKELETAL SYSTEM
N NERVOUS SYSTEM
R RESPIRATORY SYSTEM
S SENSORY ORGANS
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Table 1: Summary statistics by country
# of number of markets prod ATC4 Average prices GDP FPC REG
country corp ATC4 mol prod. /mol HHI (1) (2) (3) PC $
mean med
Argentina 250 273 1143 2892 2.5 .237 .158 14.7 1.92 1.20 7666 .137 3
Brazil 250 263 966 2711 2.8 .254 .140 2.66 .762 .362 3503 .190 3
Egypt 238 263 1038 1965 1.9 .293 .196 .287 .196 .081 1467 .097 3
Italy 215 234 669 1821 2.7 .286 .203 5.48 .293 .220 18680 .182 3
Austria 207 234 716 1311 1.8 .402 .302 14.2 .607 .510 23503 .192 2
Belgium 183 200 508 962 1.9 .396 .297 4.63 .207 .174 22271 .211 2
France 214 235 721 1800 2.5 .268 .195 3.17 .143 .125 22065 .232 2
Greece 205 223 604 1216 2.0 .401 .329 9.83 .956 .588 10281 .157 2
Japan 181 213 530 1800 3.4 .354 .247 19.5 .523 .752 37361 .164 2
Portugal 172 187 446 875 2.0 .379 .286 1.20 .113 .069 10629 .205 2
Spain 220 225 640 1620 2.5 .296 .212 4.00 .290 .200 13785 .175 2
Australia 160 172 438 909 2.1 .397 .305 8.28 .407 .316 20315 .179 1
Canada 213 236 812 2397 3.0 .246 .153 5.66 .244 .203 23198 .185 1
CzechRepublic 239 264 803 1406 1.7 .406 .332 4.50 .830 .322 5426 .220 1
Denmark 197 222 653 1890 2.9 .235 .152 24.1 .812 .823 29730 .252 1
Finland 154 184 459 695 1.5 .451 .367 12.7 .551 .508 23161 .206 1
Germany 261 289 1489 5831 3.9 .169 .097 7.83 .344 .300 22730 .189 1
Hungary 188 205 550 891 1.6 .411 .333 5.47 1.17 .430 4661 .096 1
Nether 146 172 404 1084 2.7 .393 .287 7.29 .312 .267 23314 .226 1
Norway 140 164 388 664 1.7 .437 .336 12.4 .314 .352 39484 .191 1
Poland 221 239 678 1259 1.8 .412 .314 6.89 1.60 .694 4307 .189 1
Sweden 176 204 590 1431 2.4 .306 .226 28.8 1.06 1.17 27050 .265 1
Switz 228 252 828 1336 1.6 .360 .279 9.67 .281 .339 34330 .111 1
UK 189 209 585 1054 1.8 .426 .342 6.97 .284 .282 24525 .186 1
US 264 302 1397 5785 4.1 .194 .115 16.0 .468 .470 34262 .143 1
Notes: The sample is restricted to products with positive consumption in the 1998-2003.
(1): Average prices; (2) Av of prices relative to per capita GDP (in 2000 US $); (3) Price average relative
to per capita GDP (in 2000 US $ but corrected for PPP). FPC: public consumption to GDP ratio; REG:
Regulatory level: a lower number indicates less regulation.
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Table 2: Distribution of the number of molecules of the corporations by country
country 1 2-4 5-9 10-14 15-20 21+ Total
Argentina 37 51 32 20 13 28 181
Australia 19 12 12 7 2 9 61
Austria 76 34 20 4 5 11 150
Belgium 19 32 21 7 2 8 89
Brazil 32 33 27 17 14 22 145
Canada 46 34 18 9 13 22 142
CzechRepublic 39 39 25 12 9 9 133
Denmark 37 25 16 8 5 13 104
Egypt 68 41 10 9 10 16 154
Finland 46 19 13 9 3 6 96
France 47 40 21 5 5 12 130
Germany 128 128 54 27 17 31 385
Greece 60 43 27 16 7 3 156
Hungary 26 29 14 8 4 7 88
Italy 59 73 37 18 5 9 201
Japan 28 40 41 16 8 5 138
Nether 17 26 14 7 1 13 78
Norway 36 20 14 7 5 5 87
Poland 57 37 24 11 10 6 145
Portugal 25 33 34 8 2 5 107
Spain 35 44 38 16 7 13 153
Sweden 44 38 15 9 6 12 124
Switz 57 40 23 9 6 8 143
UK 47 45 16 9 7 8 132
US 189 146 76 22 23 60 516
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Table 3: Distribution of molecule age by country
country 1 1-2 3-4 4-7 7-10 11+ Total
Argentina 23 110 185 393 308 124 1,14
Australia 13 75 82 145 99 24 438
Austria 11 109 126 251 145 74 716
Belgium 18 97 117 154 84 38 508
Brazil 32 146 179 296 202 111 966
Canada 15 102 101 229 285 80 812
CzechRepublic 20 107 105 259 198 114 803
Denmark 15 81 93 230 168 66 653
Egypt 51 213 205 278 227 64 1,038
Finland 10 71 68 166 105 39 459
France 23 86 123 268 137 84 721
Germany 29 227 172 369 411 281 1,489
Greece 14 133 97 192 103 65 604
Hungary 9 93 90 184 122 52 550
Italy 12 77 129 248 138 65 669
Japan 4 82 106 151 136 51 530
Nether 11 62 66 128 92 45 404
Norway 6 73 84 132 67 26 388
Poland 10 76 127 172 220 73 678
Portugal 14 77 80 139 89 47 446
Spain 19 104 110 215 124 68 640
Sweden 6 80 128 209 125 42 590
Switz 4 98 141 276 229 80 828
UK 16 87 98 201 127 56 585
US 13 171 205 391 360 257 1,397
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Table 4: Single country results (I): Argentina-Egypt. All products.
arg aus aut bel bra can cze den egy
1st stage price equation results including product fixed effects
Natshare -0.099 -0.065 -0.005 0.005 0.042 0.045 -0.002 0.031 0.049
HHI-local -0.013 -0.007 -0.003 0.028* -0.049 0.004 -0.049* -0.012 0.038
fsize1 -0.001 -0.009 -0.004 0.004 -0.015 -0.011 -0.006 -0.040** -0.012**
new1 -0.004 -0.003 0.009 0.024** 0.030* -0.009 0.033* 0.014 -0.004
new1*local 0.100 0.008 -0.001 0.103** -0.058 -0.018 -0.064 0.212* 0.006
new1*localm 0.013 0.003 -0.003 0.018* -0.008 0.002 -0.027 0.034 -0.005
Berry index 0.071** 0.097* -0.005 -0.012 -0.004 0.036 -0.042 -0.055 0.022
Ngen 0.027 0.010 -0.013 -0.033 — 0.116** -0.014 -0.020 —
dum-GP n.a. -0.012** -0.012 -0.013** -0.009** -0.012** 0.004 0.002 -0.019** 0.005
global price 0.005 0.003 0.007 -0.025* -0.007 -0.011 -0.019 0.028 -0.012
intercept 4.368** 3.997** 3.917** 3.602** 3.628** 3.181** 3.704** 4.303** 1.357**
N 8158 2534 3784 2839 7288 7296 3752 4868 6001
r2-w 0.894 0.290 0.288 0.341 0.761 0.051 0.195 0.177 0.913
r2-b 0.156 0.049 0.013 0.204 0.005 0.025 0.175 0.180 0.008
r2-o 0.138 0.021 0.003 0.105 0.021 0.005 0.082 0.129 0.035
F 729.78 275.59 128.28 98.25 569.13 12.26 120.07 179.83 1853.07
2nd stage regression of the 1st stage average residual
local -0.454** -0.904** -1.045** -0.991** -0.580** -0.591** -0.825** -0.957** -1.089**
localmulti -0.330 -0.935* -1.149** -0.305 — -0.248 -0.040 -0.633** —
singlemol -0.010 -0.017 0.069 -0.062 0.007 0.382** 0.254 0.004 0.271*
lsummol 0.268** -0.039 0.621** 0.568** 0.343** 0.531** 0.272** 0.053 0.211**
generic 0.111 0.129 -0.483** -1.052** -0.364** 0.402** -0.419* -0.326 -0.078
intercept -0.972 2.389* 3.234** 2.591** 1.838** 11.147** 4.625** 3.486** 3.440**
N 2180 768 1065 857 2342 2045 1027 1409 1759
r2 0.068 0.045 0.165 0.204 0.093 0.177 0.058 0.054 0.157
F 11.31 2.51 14.86 15.42 21.79 31.26 4.42 6.61 29.48
notes: **,* significant at 1% and 5% respectively.
Clustered standard errors by corporation.
All regressors except those related to age are lagged one period.
1st stage omitted regressors: (MSHARE,MSHARE2) * (local, localmulti, multinational) + time dummies
2sn stage omitted regressors: (FQUOTA, FQUOTA2) * (local, localmulti, multinational)+
2sn stage omitted regressors: CENSORLAG, CENSORMOL)
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Table 5: Single country results (II): Finland-The Netherlands. All products
fin fra ger gre hun ita jap Net
1st stage price equation results including product fixed effects
Natshare -0.072 -0.053 0.008 0.007 -0.175** 0.052 -0.037 0.016
HHI-local 0.006 -0.005 0.016 0.013 0.053 0.023 -0.008 0.010
fsize1 0.001 -0.008 -0.002 0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.010*
new1 0.022 0.010 0.016** 0.014 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.003
new1*local 0.122 0.117 0.090* -0.048 -0.136 0.091 -0.050 0.068
new1*localm 0.027 0.016 0.024** -0.005 -0.028 0.013 0.010 0.010
Berry index -0.016 0.037 0.002 0.015 -0.033 0.060** 0.096 0.131
Ngen — -0.002 0.004 -0.011 — 0.002 -0.012 -0.058*
dum-GP n.a. -0.009* -0.001 -0.003** 0.005 -0.031 -0.030** -0.041** -0.009*
global price 0.031 0.003 -0.003 0.047 0.006 -0.007 0.028* 0.015
intercept 4.146** 3.141** 3.300** 4.062** 3.645** 3.891** 4.117** 4.579**
N 1969 5798 17336 3741 2676 5759 5340 2615
r2-w 0.308 0.340 0.217 0.599 0.295 0.347 0.287 0.596
r2-b 0.353 0.313 0.313 0.000 0.088 0.013 0.048 0.042
r2-o 0.164 0.150 0.183 0.001 0.022 0.019 0.048 0.028
F 96.68 218.84 329.86 573.90 261.79 91.30 77.05 373.06
2nd stage regression of the 1st stage average residual
local -0.261 -0.685** -0.046 -1.031** -0.377 -0.446** -1.038** -0.028
localmulti — -0.393** -0.113 -0.532 — -0.413* 0.011 0.291
singlemol -0.021 -0.145 0.246** 0.728** -0.090 0.684** -0.295 0.531**
lsummol -0.030 0.532** 0.548** 0.464** 0.592** 0.053 0.317** 0.182
generic -0.834** -0.908** -0.689** -0.282 -1.132** -0.388** -0.252 -0.407*
intercept -0.259 4.586** 6.958** 3.742** 4.650** 1.230 4.933** 3.964**
N 530 1654 4956 1066 686 1680 1509 858
r2 0.050 0.200 0.157 0.136 0.113 0.046 0.103 0.048
F 2.49 29.33 65.88 11.83 7.80 5.73 12.23 3.01
notes: **,* significant at 1% and 5% respectively.
Clustered standard errors by corporation.
All regressors except those related to age are lagged one period.
1st stage omitted regressors: (MSHARE,MSHARE2) * (local, localmulti, multinational) + time dummies
2sn stage omitted regressors: (FQUOTA, FQUOTA2) * (local, localmulti, multinational)+
2sn stage omitted regressors: CENSORLAG, CENSORMOL)
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Table 6: Single country results (III): Norway-US. All products
nor pol por spa swe swi uk us
1st stage price equation results including product fixed effects
Natshare -0.077 -0.072 -0.004 0.054 0.062 0.008 0.033 0.047
HHI-local -0.056** 0.008 0.023* 0.037 0.015 0.012 0.023 0.048
fsize1 0.011 -0.000 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.002 -0.010 -0.022**
new1 -0.016 0.028* 0.010 0.018* 0.001 0.009 0.010 0.085**
new1*local 0.016 0.117 -0.004 0.129* 0.104 0.000 0.072 0.204**
new1*localm -0.001 0.025 -0.009 0.023** 0.018 -0.001 0.005 0.041**
Berry index — -0.031 -0.011 -0.017 0.005 -0.035 -0.011 0.021
Ngen -0.003 0.005 -0.029* -0.017 0.002 -0.023 -0.026 -0.041
dum-GP n.a. -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005** -0.015** -0.007 -0.006 -0.003
global price 0.006 -0.008 -0.017 0.003 0.037 -0.013 0.046** 0.007
intercept 4.623** 3.477** 3.801** 3.461** 4.574** 3.440** 4.172** 3.307**
N 1631 3643 2619 5074 3840 4410 3072 15474
r2-w 0.383 0.041 0.654 0.373 0.281 0.569 0.159 0.045
r2-b 0.000 0.428 0.014 0.127 0.149 0.010 0.031 0.243
r2-o 0.002 0.374 0.000 0.079 0.084 0.006 0.029 0.226
F 159.11 10.74 663.01 253.57 124.38 323.45 21.62 5.77
2nd stage regression of the 1st stage average residual
local 0.683 -0.645** -0.009 -0.541** -0.901** -1.102** -1.012** -0.930**
localmulti 0.063 -0.839* 0.898* 0.100 -1.208** -0.173 -0.073 0.160
singlemol 0.386 -0.513** -0.124 0.280* 0.409* -0.086 0.439* 0.502**
lsummol -0.430 0.230* 0.548** 0.359** 0.040 0.612** 0.285** 0.176**
generic -1.147** -0.800** -0.545** -0.382** -0.437* -0.349* -0.999** -0.524**
intercept 6.322** 1.632 0.906 4.683** 5.537** 4.665** 3.958** 9.178**
N 476 979 755 1475 1118 1159 867 4626
r2 0.106 0.079 0.095 0.105 0.060 0.179 0.139 0.179
F 3.89 5.87 5.57 12.19 5.92 17.85 9.83 71.80
notes: **,* significant at 1% and 5% respectively.
Clustered standard errors by corporation.
All regressors except those related to age are lagged one period.
1st stage omitted regressors: (MSHARE,MSHARE2) * (local, localmulti, multinational) + time dummies
2sn stage omitted regressors: (FQUOTA, FQUOTA2) * (local, localmulti, multinational)+
2sn stage omitted regressors: CENSORLAG, CENSORMOL)
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